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Government Access 
To Documents And 
Testimony In Federal 
Tax Cases
Accountants As “Third-party” Record 
Keepers
By Susan M. Saterfiel
As an incident to accountants’ 
representation of taxpayers in Inter­
nal Revenue Service (IRS) examina­
tions, it is necessary to be familiar 
with IRS access to books, records, 
working papers, and testimony. The 
accountant also should be able to 
recognize the earmarks of a criminal 
investigation so as to refer the client 
to an attorney when appropriate.
The IRS can use its summons 
power under IRC §7602 to gain ac­
cess to books, records, and working 
papers regardless of possession by 
taxpayers, accountants, or other 
third parties. The summons can also 
be used to require testimony. Where 
specific legal requirements are met, 
the IRS can use search warrants to 
search and seize tax records and 
working papers. After criminal cases 
are referred to the Department of 
Justice, federal grand juries can use 
their subpoena power to require pro­
duction of documents and testimony.
The Summons
The IRS obtains its power from 
§7602 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC) to examine data, to summon 
either the taxpayer or a third party, 
and to take relevant testimony for the 
purpose of ascertaining the correct­
ness of any return, making a return 
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where none has been made, or 
determining the tax liability of any 
person.1 IRS agents routinely carry 
summonses with them and sign and 
serve them when it is deemed 
necessary. The only requirements 
for the summons are that its purpose 
is for the determination of tax 
liability and that the data desired 
must be relevant to this purpose. In 
United States v. Powell,2 the “four­
fold test” for a valid summons was 
established: (1) the investigation 
must be conducted for a legitimate 
purpose; (2) the inquiry should be 
relevant to this purpose; (3) the 
desired material must not be 
possessed by the IRS; and (4) the ad­
ministrative steps required by the 
IRC must have been followed. The 
IRS does not have the power to en­
force a valid summons but must seek 
an attachment against the sum­
moned party from a court.
Notice Requirements
The 1976 Tax Reform Act added 
IRC §76093 which provides for 
special procedures in the case of 
third-party summonses. In general, if 
any summons is served on a third- 
party record keeper and such sum­
mons requires the production of 
records of any person other than that 
summoned, then notice of the sum­
mons must be given to the person 
whose transactions are described in 
the records within three days of the 
date of service. For the purposes of 
IRC §7609, the term “third-party 
record keepers” is: (1) any mutual 
savings bank or other savings in­
stitution chartered and supervised 
under Federal or State law, any 
bank, or any credit union; (2) any 
consumer reporting agency; (3) any 
person extending credit through the 
use of credit cards or similar 
devices; (4) any attorney; and (5) any 
accountant. There are several il­
lustrative cases involving the defini­
tion of the third-party record keeper.
The United States v. Exxon4 case 
involved a summons to Exxon for 
documents dealing with land being 
leased from the taxpayer by Exxon. 
The taxpayer tried to intervene by 
claiming that Exxon is a third-party 
record keeper since it extends credit 
through credit cards. The United 
States District Court ruled that since 
the records summoned were unre­
lated to credit activities, Exxon is not 
a third-party record keeper for this 
situation.
United States V. Desert Palace, 
Inc.5 provides another viewpoint. 
The IRS ordered the Desert Palace 
through a summons to turn over all 
records of transactions for a particu­
lar taxpayer. No notice was given to 
the taxpayer, but upon learning of 
the summons, the taxpayer de­
manded that the Desert Palace not 
comply. The taxpayer argued that 
the Desert Palace was a third-party 
record keeper and that the summons 
was not enforceable since the tax­
payer was not given notice. The IRS 
said that the Desert Palace was not a 
third-party record keeper; however, 
the United States District Court ruled 
that the Desert Palace was, in fact, a 
third-party record keeper due to its 
extending credit to customers. The 
summons was not upheld since 
formal notice was not given to the 
taxpayer.
To further clarify the definition of 
third-party record keeper, consider 
the United States v. White Agency6 
case. In this case, the taxpayer was 
seeking to intervene in connection 
with the summons of employment 
and compensation records of the 
taxpayer. It was determined by the 
IRS that the White Agency was not a 
third-party record keeper; therefore, 
no notice to the taxpayer was 
necessary. The taxpayer argued that 
the agency was a broker which is a 
third-party record keeper under 
§7609 (a) (3) of the IRC. However, the 
court ruled that the summons was 
directed at the property of the White 
Agency. The taxpayer had no signifi­
cant protectable interest in such 
property. Since the agency was not 
acting in its role as broker, it was not 
a third-party record keeper. The 
court ordered compliance with the 
summons. In the 1978 case, United 
States v. J. Joseph Gartland, Inc.,7 it 
was ruled that a corporation is not a 
third-party record keeper as defined 
in §7609.
Section 7609 does not apply to 
summons if: (1) it is solely to deter­
mine the identify of any person hav­
ing a numbered account with a bank 
or other institution; or (2) it is in aid 
of the collection of the liability of any 
person against whom an assess­
ment has been made or judgment 
rendered. A case illustrating this 
situation is United States v. Com­
monwealth National Bank.8 This 
case involved a taxpayer who 
argued that a summons had been 
given to a third-party record keeper 
and he had not been given notice in 
accordance with §7609 of the IRC. 
However, the court ruled that since 
the summons was issued to aid in 
the collection of a tax liability from a 
person against whom a judgment 
has been made, the rule concerning 
notice of the taxpayer does not 
apply.
Right to Intervene
Section 7609 further grants any 
person who is entitled to notice of a 
summons the right to intervene in the 
enforcement of such summons and 
the right to stay compliance if written 
notice not to comply is given to the 
person summoned and to the IRS 
within 14 days. The IRS will then be 
prevented from examination of the 
summoned documents until a court 
order for enforcement is obtained.
The John Doe Summons
Another provision of IRC §7609 is 
the use of the John Doe summons. A 
John Doe summons is any summons 
which does not identify the person 
with respect to whose liability the 
summons is issued. In United States 
v. Bisceglia,9 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the IRS 
has the authority to issue a John Doe 
summons to a bank or other 
depository to discover the identity of 
a person who has had bank transac­
tions suggesting the possibility of 
liability for unpaid taxes. The failure 
to have a name on the summons 
does not make it unenforceable. To 
determine the tax liability of a tax­
payer, the IRS requested names and 
addresses from the telephone com­
pany of three of the telephone num­
bers appearing on a taxpayer’s 
telephone bill in the 1979 case 
United States v. South Central Bell 
Telephone Company.10 The Tele­
phone Company claimed that there 
had been no notice made to the three 
subscribers before the delivery of 
notice to the third-party. In ruling, 
the United States District Court held 
that a John Doe summons does not 
apply if the subscribers are not 
being investigated as to their tax 
liability.
Handwriting Exemplars
One question involving the scope 
of the IRS summons is the use of the 
summons to produce handwriting 
samples. There have been conflict­
ing rulings over whether §7602 of the 
IRC permits the IRS to require a tax­
payer to create a document by giv­
ing handwriting exemplars.
In United States v. Campbell,11 the 
Eighth Circuit Court rules that hand- 
writing exemplars are not 
testimonial but are a physical 
characteristic of the person. The 
Court ruled that §7602 of the IRC of 
1954 gives the IRS the authority to 
summon handwriting exemplars and 
ordered the summons enforced. In 
United States v. Rosinsky,the 
Fourth Circuit Court ruled that since 
under a grand jury subpoena a wit­
ness may be compelled to give hand­
writing exemplars and since the IRS 
power to summon is essentially the 
same as the grand jury’s, a summons 
to require handwriting exemplars is 
valid. However, in the United States 
District Court cases of United States 
v. Del Sandro13 and United States v. 
Lewis,14 the IRS was found not to 
have the power to compel handwrit­
ing exemplars.
The conflict in the rulings was 
resolved by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. 
Euge.15 It was held that Congress 
has empowered the IRS to compel 
handwriting exemplars under the 
summons authority of §7602. The 
decision was based upon the fact 
that the duty to appear and give 
At initial confrontation the 
accountant should inquire if a 
special agent is involved.
testimony in §7602 has traditionally 
included a duty to provide some form 
of nontestimonial, physical evi­
dence, such as handwriting.
Summons Directed to 
Taxpayer’s Accountant
The accountant should recognize 
that IRS revenue agents are charged 
with civil enforcement and that IRS 
special agents are charged with 
criminal enforcement. Normally the 
accountant cooperates with the IRS 
and turns over books, records, and 
working papers after obtaining 
client approval. If a special agent 
appears, however, the accountant 
should advise the client to seek legal 
counsel. It is important, therefore, for 
the accountant to inquire if there is a 
special agent involved when initially 
confronted by the IRS. In the United 
States v. Tweel,16 the accountant 
was told that there was not a special 
agent on the case. However, the 
audit was made at the request of the 
Organized Crime and Racketeering 
Section of the Department of Justice. 
The conviction was reversed due to 
an unreasonable search under the 
Fourth Amendment.
In the Couch v. United States17 
case, the accountant was in posses­
sion of the taxpayer’s bank state­
ments, payroll records, and sales 
and expenditure reports. Where the 
accountant had the taxpayer’s con­
sent, a revenue agent was allowed to 
begin an examination of the records. 
Upon the revenue agent’s findings, a 
special agent was called in to partic­
ipate in the investigation. The tax­
payer withdrew the permission pre­
viously granted, and the special 
agent issued a summons to the ac­
countant. The Fifth Amendment right 
and the accountant-client privilege 
were claimed by the taxpayer as 
grounds for nonenforcement of the 
summons. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the Fifth Amendment is not
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Fifth Amendment defense for 
the taxpayer has never been 
fully explored.
available to the taxpayer when the 
summons is given to the accountant 
and that state accountant-client 
privilege statutes are unavailable in 
federal tax investigations.
Summons Directed to 
Taxpayer’s Attorney
The leading case involving a sum­
mons to the taxpayer’s attorney is 
Fisher v. United States.18 The tax­
payer was being investigated for 
possible civil or criminal liability 
under federal income tax laws. After 
obtaining certain relevant docu­
ments from the accountant, the tax­
payer transferred the documents to 
the attorney. The IRS issued a sum­
mons to the attorney who refused to 
surrender the documents on the 
grounds of the Fifth Amendment and 
the attorney-client privilege. The 
summons was ordered enforced.
In the 1976 United States v. 
Heiberger19 case, the taxpayer’s law­
yer was also an accountant. The tax­
payer resisted the summons for the 
working papers on the tax return 
since the return was prepared by the 
lawyer and thus privileged. However, 
the court ruled that as far as this 
case was concerned, the taxpayer 
had consulted the lawyer in the role 
of accountant. Therefore, attorney­
client privilege was not relevant for 
the summons.
Taxpayer in Possession
The question as to whether a tax­
payer in possession can use the Fifth 
Amendment as a defense to non- 
compliance with the summons has 
not been fully explored. In United 
States v. Beattie,20 the taxpayer was 
summoned to appear and bring all of 
the working papers prepared by the 
CPA which were used in the prep­
aration of the individual tax return. 
These documents requested in­
cluded but were not limited to trial 
balances, balance sheet, adjusting 
and closing entries, working papers, 
notes, memoranda, and any corre­
spondence used in the preparation 
of the return. The Circuit Court held 
that production of copies of letters 
sent by the accountant to the tax­
payer would not violate the tax­
payer’s privilege against self-in­
crimination. However, the Court held 
that production of letters sent by the 
taxpayer to the accountant and 
retrieved from the accountant by the 
taxpayer in anticipation of a criminal 
tax investigation would violate the 
taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
The Court ruled that the Fifth 
Amendment protects against com­
pulsory production of papers written 
by an accused with respect to one’s 
own affairs and presently in one’s 
own possession whether or not pre­
viously sent to another for the latter’s 
retention.
In United States v. Knight,21 the 
taxpayer had possession of account­
ant’s working papers and asserted 
the self-incrimination defense. The 
District Court ruled that account­
ants’ role in creating documents 
place them outside any Fifth Amend­
ment privilege. The taxpayer’s 
possession of the papers does not 
bring them within the privilege.
Defenses to the Summons
Illegal Purpose. The United States 
v. LaSalle National Bank22 case es­
tablished two nonexclusive require­
ments for enforcement of an IRS 
summons: (1) summons must be 
issued before the IRS recommends 
to the Department of Justice that a 
criminal prosecution be undertaken; 
and (2) summons authority must be 
used in good-faith pursuit of the con­
gressionally authorized purposes of 
§7602. Further, this case pointed out 
that before recommendation to the 
Department of Justice, tax fraud 
cases are both civil and criminal. 
Therefore, the intent of the agent 
cannot be the measuring stick. The 
question as to whether an investiga­
tion has solely criminal purposes 
can be answered only by an ex­
amination of the “institutional 
posture” of the IRS. Those opposing 
enforcement must bear the burden of 
disproving the actual existence of a 
valid civil tax determination or col­
lection purpose by the IRS. In the 
1979 case United States v. Chemical 
Bank,23 the taxpayer said that the 
summons was issued to the Chemi­
cal Bank solely for a criminal inves­
tigation. The claim was made due to 
the fact that the return was being ex­
amined as an independent audit 
within the Brooklyn District Internal 
Revenue Service Strike Force Pro­
gram which is coordinated by the 
Department of Justice. The Strike 
Force designates the subject to be 
audited by the IRS; thereafter, the 
IRS is autonomous. The Second Cir­
cuit Court ruled that there was no in­
dication that the civil liability search 
had ended; therefore, the enforce­
ment of the summons was ordered. 
Holding up of a criminal indictment 
against a taxpayer in order for the 
IRS to gather information for the FBI 
was ruled in United States v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank24 to be grounds for 
nonenforcement of a summons.
Relevancy. The IRS must show 
relevancy between the summons 
and the legitimate purpose for the in­
vestigation. In the United States v. 
Coopers and Lybrand25 case, the tax 
return of the corporate taxpayer was 
prepared by accounting personnel 
within the corporation. However, the 
IRS issued summonses to Coopers 
and Lybrand for tax accrual files 
prepared by the taxpayer and for the 
CPA firm’s audit program used in the 
audit of the taxpayer. The Tenth Cir­
cuit Court held the summonses as 
unenforceable on the grounds of 
irrelevancy and immateriality to the 
determination of the tax liability of 
the taxpayer. Further, the case 
brought out that if the IRS fails to 
show that material is relevant to the 
purpose of the investigation, then 
the summons is overbroad and 
unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. The case of United 
States v. Matras26 denied enforce­
ment to an IRS summons for a tax­
payer's budgets. The IRS had re­
quested the documents to provide 
them with a “road map” for the in­
vestigation. The Eighth Circuit Court 
ruled that the IRS failed to prove the 
relevancy of the budgets and that the 
issue of whether budgets are poten­
tially relevant to an investigation 
must be determined on an ad hoc 
basis. Finally, the term “relevance” 
was defined to mean more than 
“convenience.” The Supreme Court 
upheld the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
in California Bankers Association v. 
Schultz.27 This act requires financial 
institutions to maintain records of 
the identities of customers and to 
maintain microfilm copies of 
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customer transactions for use in 
criminal, tax, or regulatory inves­
tigations. Title II of the Bank Secrecy 
Act requires reports of transfer of 
more than $5,000 into or outside of 
the United States and of domestic 
deposits or withdrawals in excess of 
$10,000.
The Search Warrant
The utilization of the search war­
rant is restricted by the Fourth 
Amendment requirements of prob­
able cause. The Fourth Amendment 
requires that: (1) a search warrant 
must be obtained from a neutral and 
detached magistrate; (2) evidence 
must establish probable cause that a 
crime has been committed; (3) the 
warrant must describe the place to 
be searched and items to be seized; 
and (4) there must be a connection 
between the item to be seized and 
the crime alleged.
In Andreson v. Maryland,28 a sole 
practitioner attorney was under 
fraud investigation. Investigators 
received search warrants to search 
the law office to obtain evidence. 
Although the bottom of the search 
warrant contained the phrase 
“together with other fruits, instru­
mentalities and evidence of crime at 
this time unknown,” the warrant was 
not found to be an illegal general 
warrant, because the phrase was 
referring to a particular real estate 
lot.
The Fourth Amendment protection 
of corporations was shown by the 
G.M. Leasing v. United States29 case. 
The warrantless entry and seizure of 
books and records was in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. However, 
the seizure of automobiles in public 
places for collection of taxes was 
ruled as not invading privacy and 
therefore, such seizure required no 
search warrant.
The Grand Jury 
Subpoena
The grand jury deliberates in 
secret and is given a wide range of 
authority to determine if a criminal 
crime has been committed. There 
need be no showing of probable 
cause and there need be no notice 
given to the taxpayer that he is being 
examined. Therefore, it is a more 
powerful discovery tool than the 
summons. The taxpayer’s right to 
refuse to answer irrelevant ques­
tions is limited and by a grant of im­
munity the taxpayer’s testimony may 
be compelled.
In General Motors v. United 
States,30 the Circuit Court ruled that 
grand jury subpoenas are not final 
decisions for purposes of appeal. 
Thus, the Interlocutory Appeals Act 
of 1958 which provides appeal rights 
from interim or non-final decisions 
applies to civil and not to criminal 
cases.
Summary And Conclusion
The accountant in tax practice is 
often caught between IRS demands 
and the client’s desire to resist. 
Therefore, it is important to be 
familiar with vital aspects of govern­
ment procedures relating to pro­
duction of documents.
One method of access is through 
the IRS summons. The IRS is bound 
by the United States v. Powell “four­
fold test” of good faith and by the 
United States v. LaSalle rule limiting 
use of summons after the decision to 
prosecute. Further, the IRS must 
show relevancy between the sum­
mons and the purpose of the inves­
tigation.
When the accountant is in posses­
sion of the requested documents, the 
Fifth Amendment is not available as 
a defense against production, and 
no accountant-client privilege is re­
cognized. When the attorney is in 
possession, papers do not achieve a 
greater protection than they would 
have in the taxpayer’s possession. 
The Fifth Amendment may be used 
by the taxpayer when the “private 
papers” of the taxpayer are involved.
A search warrant is limited by
Susan M. Saterfiel, CPA, CIA, is 
Controller at Oktibbeha County Hos­
pital, Starkville, MS. She is a member 
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Fourth Amendment conditions of 
probable cause and is available both 
to individuals and to corporations. 
The grand jury subpoena need not 
show probable cause nor give 
notice. As such, it is the most power­
ful means of access available.
Accountants should keep abreast 
of changes in government access in 
order to guide the client through any 
civil IRS review process and to refer 
the client to counsel at the appropri­
ate point.Ω
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